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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
Case

No.
COMBINED METALS REDUCTION COMPANY
6869
EUREKA LILLY CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY .
6870
TINTIC STANiDARiD MINING COMPANY .
.6871
COLORADO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY
6872
CHIEF CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY
.6873
MONTANA BINGHAM CONSOLiiDATEiD MINING
COMPANY.........
. ......... .
6874
UNITEiD STATES SMELTING, REFINING ANiD
MINING COMPANY . . . .
6875
EUREKA BULLION MINING COMPANY .
6876
INTERNATIONAL SMELTING ANiD REFINING COMPANY 6877
NATIONAL TUNNEL & MINES COMPANY
6878
OHIO COPPER COMPANY OF UTAH
........
6879
Plaintiff and Respondents

vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION and J. LAMBERT GIBSON,
ROSCOE E. HAMMONiD, MILTON TWITCHELL and
HEBER BENNION, JR., constituting said Tax Commission.
Defendants and Appellants.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
We thank the Court for its courtesy in affording us
this opportunity to further discuss questions raised upon
the oral argument and other matters then mentioned but
not argued.
Before analyzing the illustration suggested at the oral
argument or adapting it to the facts and statute here
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involved, we shall refer to a few fundamental propos,itions
concerning which there can be no possible controversy.

SECTION 80-5-66, U. C. A. 1943
Section 80-5-66, U. C. A. 1943, was enacted in its
present form by Section 3 of Chapter 101, Laws of Utah,
1937, and requires exaction of an occupation tax "equal
to one per cent of the gross amount received for or the
gross value of metalliferous ore sold." It expressly provides
in subsection (a) that where the ore or metals "is sold
under a bona fide contract of sale the amount of money
or its equivalent actually received by the owner * * *
from the sale" less a reasonable transportation cost "from
the place where mined to the place where, under the contmct of sa,le the ore is to be delivered" shall be the basis
for computing the tax. In order to avoid discrimination
as between the independent producer and the producer
treating its own ores, it is provided in subsection (b) that
the disposal by the producer operating his own production
works "shall be treated as a sale within the meaning of
this section for the purpose of determining gross proceeds
or otherwise," and that in such determination rates and
charges, etc. applicable to ores of like character from
independent sources shall be applied.
1t would seem clear that the section had and has two

vital objectives: ( 1) the fixing of a yardstick for determining the tax; and (2) the avoidance of any discrimination
as between the independent producer and the producer
treating its own ores.
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WHAT IS THE YARDSTICK?
Of course no one has contended or will contend that
the Legislature failed in its effort to avoid discrimination
as between the independent producer and the producer
treating its own ores or that the yardstick used in measuring
the occupation tax of one should not be used in measuring
that of the other. The controversy centers about the nature
and identity of the yardstick. Since it is admitted that
each independent producer sold its ore or metals "under
a bona fide contract of sale" and that the gross amount
"actually received" by it from the purchaser was as contended by it and as set forth in its report to the Tax Commission less a reasonable transportation cost "from the
place where mined to the place where, under the contract
of sale," the ore was delivered, and since, pursuant to said
subsection (b), the tax of other respondents must be
measured by the same yardstick, there is obviously no
basis for the contention of appellants, unless the subsidy
payments were a part of the money "actually received
from the sale," consummated as in the statute
* *
provided, "under· a bona fide contract of sale."
What "contract of sale" was ever entered into by any
respondent other than its contract of sale with the purchaser as alleged by it and admitted by appellants? What
"contract of sale" or other document or instrument except
those alleged by respondents contained any provision as
to where "the ore is to be delivered" or would throw any
light on the proper deduction to be made for transportation
"from the place where mined to the place where, under the
contract of sale. the ore is to be delivered"?
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Long before the mine occupation tax law was enacted the
Utah Legislature defined in our Uniform Sales Act what
it means when it speaks of a contract to sell goods as
follows:
"A contract to sell goods is a contract whereby
the seller agrees to transfer the property in goods
to the buyer for a consideration called the price."
It thus defines a sale of goods:

"A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the
seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer
for a consideration called the price."
Confessedly the receipt or payment of any subsidy was
not a term or condition of any contract of sale, was of no
concern to any purchaser, and the passing of title in and to
ores or metals under or pursuant to any contract of sale
was in no manner dependent on or affected by any subsidy
payment. In the case of the independent producer title
to the ores passed to the purchaser before application for
the payment of any premiums could even be made and it
is not claimed that it was ever the condition of any contract
of sale that if premiums were not paid the sale might be
rescinded. In the case of ores mined by companies which
also processed them-smelting or reduction companiespremiums were paid long before the metals recovered from
the ores were even available for sale and it is not claimed
that Metals Reserve Company had any right to demand
the return of the premiums paid in the event such metals
were not subsequently sold.
As we read the Act, every pertinent clause or section
unmistakably discloses the intent of the Legislature to
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make the "basis for computing the occupation tax imposed
by this act" the purchase price paid by the buyer under
his contract of sale with the seller, after deducting transportation cost of the ore "from the place where mined to
the place where, under the contract of sale," the ore was
delivered; that intent is shown and confirmed by Section
80-5-55, U. C. A. 1943, originally enacted in its present
form by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 1937, which directs
the State Tax Commission to prepare an "Occupation Tax
and Assessment Book of Mines, in which must be entered
all occupation taxes fixed and the assessment of all mines."
Naturally the entries in that "Book" would identify the
basis of the tax. The basis for the occupation tax here involved is thus identified in subsection (6) of Section 805-55:
"(6) Amount received for ore and metal if
sold; if not sold, the value thereof."
By the later sections above cited care is taken to
insure against fraud or overreaching by the provision that
the contract under which the ore is sold must be "a bona
fide contract of sale." Understanding human nature and
realizing that in the absence of fraud a producer would
not enter into a contract for the sale of his ore unless the
agreed purchase price fairly represented its market value,
it is neither unnatural nor unreasonable that the Legislature was willing to fix as the yardstick for measuring the
tax the purchase price received by the seller "under a bona
fide contract of sale," less the transportation cost above
mentioned.
We do not know of any contract of sale to which any
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respondent was a party that had not been entered into and
was not in full force and effect at and prior to the time
when subsidies began. Such contracts of sale have been an
essential and universally known incident to our mining
industry from the beginning and are identified in the statute
as clearly as the English language will permit. Both
ancient usage and the express words of the Act unmistakably tie the yardstick to such contracts of sale if "bona
fide" and limit an occupation tax to one per cent of the
amount received "under," that is to say pursuant to the
terms and provisions of, such contracts, less the specified
deduction.
Under what legal principle or rule of construction could
the payment of a subsidy or other reward by an utter
stranger to the contract of sale change or in any manner
affect that contract or any agreement of the parties thereto
or increase or decrease the purchase price or the amount
"actually received" pursuant thereto? Had the Government failed to pay any promised subsidy, would such failure
have prevented a passing of title from the seller to the
buyer as contemplated in the contract of sale or would
it have affected the right of either to enforce every term
and provision of the contract as written, precisely as if
no subsidy had ever been promised, paid, or unpaid?
THE ILLUSTRATION DISCUSSED AT THE ORAL
ARGUMENT
As we understood and recall, the substance of the
illustration used upon the oral argument was:
"A father feels that his son is lazy and wants
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to induce him to be more diligent. Ordinarily 2400
hours would be worked in a year. The father says
to the son: 'For every hour you work in excess
of 1500 hours in the year I will pay you an amount
equal to that you receive from your employer.' Is
the money received from his father derived from the
son's labor? Is it wages? Should it be considered
in arriving at the 'value' of the son's labor?"
In the illustrated case it doubtless is assumed that if
the son had not complied with the conditions specified in the
father's offer he would have not received any payment from
his father and that he did receive payment as a result of
his compliance. But it does not seem to us that the payments made by the father constituted "wages" and presumably the "value" of the son's services was reflected in
the wages paid by the employer. Clearly the amount paid
by the father would not be taken into account in computing
premiums on Workmen's Compensation or contributions
and deductions to be made under Social Security and Unemployment Compensation laws. The payments made by
the father could not be deducted in computing his net income, since the son was neither a charitable nor educational
institution.
But, regardless of what may be the correct answer
(either Yes or No) to each of the questions propounded in the
illustration, we cannot see how that answer can be material
in deciding any question to be determined in the cases at
bar. It does seem to us that similar facts, if applied to an
occupation tax statute like that here involved, very aptly
illustrate why the contributions of the father to his son
could not be included or considered in computing an occupa-

8

tion tax exacted from the son as a condition to his right
to follow his vocation.
Let us assume: that the son was a small rancher or
farmer who confined his entire herd to fifty sheep by disposing of all his lambs and preventing any increase beyond
the quota of fifty; that his father had the laudable desire to
make the son a successful sheepman and to accomplish that
end told his son that he would give him a dollar for each
sheep by which he would increase his herd in addition to
the original fifty; and that, spurred by this incentive, the
son saves his lambs, increases his herd to one hundred and
fifty sheep and, for the one hundred head increase, receives
from his father $100 cash in complete fulfillment of the
father's promise. Let us also assume that the Legislature
has seen fit to enact an occupation tax law applicable to
sheep raisers like the son with provisions like those of the
statute involved on these appeals, the tax being computed
at a percentage of the amount "actually received" by sheep
raisers "from the sale of all" sheep during the calendar
year. Later the son decides that one hundred and fifty
sheep are too many for him and sells to the butcher twentyfive of his original herd and twenty-five of the added one
hundred sheep of identical kind and character, all at the
same price per head. In computing the tax should the Tax
Commission include the $100 paid by the father as a part
of the money or its equivalent "actually received" by the
son "from the sale" of the sheep? It is true that without
these rewards he probably would not have increased his
production of sheep over that of previous years. It is true
that the rewards increased his income. But the fact still
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remains that the only money or its equivalent received "from
the sale" or "under" any "contract of sale" was that paid by
the butcher. The rewards were made for production of
sheep, just as appellants accurately state on page 29 of their
brief: "The premium payments were made for production
of ore." Although the State Tax Commission might think
that the Legislature gravely erred in tying the yardstick
to the consideration received from the sale of sheep and
should have provided that it be computed on an income
basis, such thought, whether right or wrong, could not
repeal or modify the statute.
If there were a meat shortage such as we have suffered during recent years and the Goverment, in an effort
to increase the supply, offered and paid the same rewards
as those offered and paid by the father, the meaning, force
and effect of the occupation ,tax statute would remain unchanged and the amount of the tax payable would not be
increased, diminished or otherwise affected by the subsidy
payments.

CONCERNING "VALUE"
Of course it was the intention of the Legislature that
the amount received by the seller pursuant to the contract
of sale should fairly represent the value of the ore or metals
sold. The purpose of the provision that the amount received
by the seller, upon which the one per cent t?.x might be
levied, shall be proceeds from ore or metals "sold under a
bona fide contract of sale," is manifest. By any known
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definition of value, the full value of respondents' ores and
metals was the top price received by them. It is not only
stipulated that all ores and metals were sold under bona fide
contracts of sale but, from the admitted facts, it conclusively appears that any higher price would have been unlawful.
The ceiling prices on metals were all fixed at the top price
then available in a free and uncontrolled market. Those
ceilings were lawfully established. Only a crystal-gazer
will attempt to guess what the price might have been had
no ceilings been fixed. The assessment here complained of
and the yardstick applied in arriving at the tax do not and
could not rest in whole or in part upon any guess as to what
the price of metals might have been in a free market during
the year 1943.
We believe the observa,tions of the Montana court in
the Klies case, from which we quote at length on pages
23-8 of our original brief, and other illustrations there employed by us, aptly demonstrate not only why the subsidy
payments are no part of the amount received by the owner
"from the sale," but why they could have no possible materiality in arriving at the value of respondents' ore and metals.
In this connection we think it worth while to again refer to
the son who was induced to increase his herd of sheep because of rewards offered by the father or the Government.
If the butcher "under a bona fide contract of sale" was willing to pay the top market price and as great a price as could
be lawfully exacted, it would be difficult to convince him
or any other purchaser that the sheep were worth more than
that top price. Neither he nor any other buyer would be
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able to understand why the twenty-five purchased sheep
which were a part of the original herd did not have as great
"value" as the twenty-five purchased sheep of identical kind
and character which came from the increase over 1the fixed
quota. The butcher or any other buyer would be unable to
see how or why rewards paid by the father or the Government could or should affect the matter of "value" or be a part
of or in any manner related to "the amount of money or its
equivalent actually received by the owner ... from the sale
of" sheep. For a further discussion of this phase of the case
we invite attention to our original brief at pages 29-31.
Since equality of purchase price and value must have
been contemplated by the Legislature, that equality would
necessarily be impossible if the subsidies were included as
a part of the purchase price. This is true because on no
possible theory could an amount paid as a subsidy be added
to the purchase price paid by the butcher or smelter, in
arriving at the "value" of the goods sold. Therefore if "the
amount of money or its equivalent actually received by the
owner ... from the sale" were construed to include not only
the amount actually received from the sale, but also the subsidies, the contemplated equality between ,the amount received from the sale and "value" could not exist. Under
such a construction of the statute, a respondent who sold
his ore for a purchase price of $50,000 and received subsidies aggregating $10,000 would be deemed to have "actually received . . . from the sale" of his ore $50,000 plus
$10,000, to wit, $60,000, whereas manifestly the "value" of
his ore was $50,000 only.
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SUBSIDIES ARE NOT PROCEEDS "FROM THE SALE"
OF ORES OR METALS
Since there were no quotas, no subsidy payments, and
not even a war when our Occupation Tax Act was passed,
it cannot be said that the Legislature intended to impose an
occupation tax on subsidy payments. However, that fact is
no reason for excluding them if the language of the statute
is broad enough to include them. They were also unknown
and not foreseen by the Legislature when it enacted our
income tax law. But they were and are a part of the "income" of those who receive them and are properly taxable
under our income tax law. The fact that uranium may not
have been known or supposed to exist in the State and that
the Legislature could not have foreseen that there would
ever be any income from its production or proceeds from
its sale would not prevent full application of our occupation
tax law to proceeds from the sale of uranium ore, because it
is metalliferous ore and proceeds from its sale are therefore
subject to the tax. We have no quarrel with a rule of
statutory construction permitting taxation under facts and
statutes like those just indicated. But that rule has no
application in the cases at bar. As already indicated and
universally known, contracts for the sale of metalliferous
ores and metals are and always have been instruments of
a definite character pursuant to which title in ores and
metals is transferred from the seller to the buyer for a
consideration therein specified and agreed upon by the
parties to the contract. Under the "bona fide contract of
sale" which the Legislature definitely identifies in the
statute, the "money or its equivalent actually received by
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the owner * * * from the sale" did not include and
could not have been intended to include any reward or
benefit voluntarily conferred by the Government or by some
friend or father of the seller which was in no way furnished
or induced by the purchaser and was not paid or payable
under any contract of sale. And the yardstick of the statute
is unmistakably tied to the contracts of sale therein mentioned.
Respectfully submitted,
H. VAN DAM,
Attorney for Respondent Combined Metals
Reduction Company.
CHENEY, JENSEN, MARR & WILKINS,
Attorneys for Respondents Chief Consolidated
Mining Company, Montana Bingham Consolidated Mining Company, United States
Smelting, Refining and Mining Company.
FARNSWORTH & VAN COTT,
Attorneys for Respondents Eureka Bullion
Mining Company, International Smelting and
Refining Company, National Tunnel & Mines
Company, Ohio Copper Company of Utah.
INGEBRETSEN, RAY, RAWLINS
& CHRISTENSEN,
Attorneys for Respondents Eureka Lilly Consolidated Mining Company, Tintic Standard
Mining Company, Colorado Consolidated Mining Company.

